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Comment
MARYLAND'S CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT:
A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
INTRODUCTION
Consumers seeking to recover for damages caused by sellers' false and
misleading statements have had considerable difficulty establishing the
elements of the two theories traditionally available to them, tort actions for
deceit' and contract actions for breach of express and implied warranties. 2
An element of the common law action of deceit is scienter, knowledge of the
falsity of the statement. 3 Moreover, even if a consumer is able to prove the
1. Under Maryland law in an action for deceit a plaintiff must establish five
elements: (1) that a representation made by the defendant was false; (2) that either its
falsity was known to the defendant or the misrepresentation was made with such
reckless indifference to truth as to impute knowledge to him; (3) that the
misrepresentation was made for the purpose of defrauding the plaintiff; (4) that the
plaintiff not only relied upon the misrepresentation but had the right to rely upon it
with full belief in its truth, and that he would not have done the thing from which
damage resulted if it had not been made; and (5) that the plaintiff suffered damage
directly resulting from the misrepresentation. Appel v. Hupfield, 198 Md. 374, 378, 84
A.2d 94, 95-96 (1951); Gittings v. Von Dorn, 136 Md. 10, 109 A. 553 (1920). The
requirement of purpose to defraud appears to be contrary to the general rule that
intent to injure the plaintiff is not required. See James & Gray, Misrepresentation,
Part I, 37 MD. L. REV. 286, 295 (1977) [hereinafter cited as James & Gray I]. A
showing of fraud also requires proof by clear and convincing evidence. Peurifoy v.
Congressional Motors, Inc., 254 Md. 501, 517, 255 A-2d 332, 340 (1969).
As an alternative to bringing an action for deceit, recovery may be obtained
on the basis of a negligent misrepresentation. Vance v. Vance, 408 A.2d 728, 731 (Md.
1979).
2. Such an action would only be possible in cases in which the "misrepresenta-
tion" made was a material one relating to the subject matter of the contract. See, e.g.,
Twombley v. Fuller Brush Co., 221 Md. 476, 489-91, 158 A.2d 110, 116-18 (1959); Reid
v. Hughlett, 135 Md. 613, 108 A. 477 (1919). An aggrieved consumer of goods might
also utilize Uniform Commercial Code remedies arising out of the Code's warranty,
good faith, and unconscionability provisions. See Comment, Consumer Protection in
Georgia: The Fair Business Practices Act of 1975, 25 EMORY L.J. 445, 448-51 (1975).
Doctrines of caveat emptor traditionally have hampered consumers in their
efforts to obtain effective redress for harm suffered as a result of unfair or deceptive
trade practices. See Developments in the Law: Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1005, 1016-17 (1967). See generally Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40
YALE L.J. 1133 (1931); Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law,
87 HARV. L. REV. 917, 945-52 (1974). For a discussion of common law remedies and
attendant legal obstacles, see Hester, Deceptive Sales Practices and Form Contracts
- Does the Consumer Have a Private Remedy?, 1968 Du.E L.J. 831. Remedies
preexisting consumer protection legislation include tort actions for misrepresentation
or strict liability and contract actions for rescission or damages.
3. For instances of failure to establish the scienter element, see Canatella v.
Davis, 264 Md. 190, 198-200, 286 A.2d 122, 126-27 (1972); Lambert v. Smith, 235 Md.
284, 287, 201 A.2d 491, 493, 493-94 (1964).
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defendant's knowledge of the falsity of the statement, his right to recover
may be cut off by a "puffing" defense. 4
Maintaining a successful contract action also presents difficulties.
Although an action for breach of express warranties may lie when a promise
has been made in writing, there is often no remedy for oral misrepre-
sentations. 5 Further, the Uniform Commercial Code provisions on implied
warranties, which apply to many consumer transactions, cover only sales of
consumer goods.6 Although the seller's ability to limit implied warranties of
merchantability in contracts for consumer goods is proscribed in Maryland,7
a consumer's remedies in other contract actions are often limited by sellers'
skillful drafting of contract clauses."
In addition to the difficulties the consumer faces in trying to establish
the elements of a tort or contract action, there is the problem that some
misleading statements are not covered by any existing action. For example,
there is no traditional legal remedy for misleading statements of opinion 9 or
statements not relating to the good or service that is the subject of the
4. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 109, at 722-23 (4th ed.
1971). At common law a misrepresentation does not provide grounds for redress if it is
a statement of opinion (puffing) rather than fact. Hester, supra note 2, at 840; James
& Gray, Misrepresentation, Part II, 37 MD. L. REv. 488, 488-96 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as James & Gray II]. See Appel v. Hupfield, 198 Md. 374, 379-81, 84 A.2d 94,
96-97 (1951).
A similar defense is available in actions for breach of express warranty under
the Uniform Commercial Code. It provides that any "affirmation of fact or promise
made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the
basis of the bargain" creates an express warranty, MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN.
§ 2-313(1) (1975) (emphasis supplied), and that "an affirmation merely of the value of
the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation
of the goods does not create a warranty, id. § 2-313(2) (emphasis supplied). For a
discussion of the difficulty in determining whether a statement is a "puff' or a
warranty, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-3, at 274-76
(1972).
5. One difficulty may be proving that oral statements were in fact made. A
second is that, even if they can be proved, the parol evidence rule may bar their
admission. Although in theory the parol evidence rule does not bar evidence to show
mistake or fraud, in practice the presence of integration clauses in contracts may
result in courts' relying on the rule. See Hester, supra note 2, at 836-40.
6. In Maryland, however, they relate to leases and bailments for hire, as well as
sales, of goods. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-314(4) (Cum. Supp. 1979). Some courts
have begun to find express and implied warranties in the provision of commercial
services. Texas Metal Fabricating Co. v. Northern Gas Prods. Corp., 404 F.2d 921 (10th
Cir. 1968) (Kansas law); Vitromar Piece Dye Works v. Lawrence of London, Ltd., 119
Ill. App. 2d 301, 256 N.E.2d 135 (1969); Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258
A.2d 697 (1969); McCool v. Hoover Equip. Co., 415 P.2d 954 (Okla. 1966). But see, e.g.,
LaRossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968).
7. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 2-316.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
8. See generally Weintraub, Disclaimer of Warranties and Limitations of
Damages for Breach of Warranty Under the UCC, 53 TEx. L. REV. 60 (1974); Note,
Warranties, Disclaimers and the Parol Evidence Rule, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 858 (1953).
9. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
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transaction.10 Most significantly, traditional theories afford only very
limited protection against misrepresentation by omission, the failure to state
relevant facts."
The Maryland Consumer Protection Act, 12 enacted in 1973,' 3 provides a
private cause of action for consumers harmed by several specified unfair or
deceptive trade practices, which consist of various types of false and
misleading statements made in consumer transactions. The statute affords a
remedy for some misrepresentations not covered by traditional theories, in
particular, misleading omissions' 4 and misrepresentations of the affiliation
of a seller or a good.'5
This Comment will examine the provisions of the Act relating to the
private cause of action, particularly the proscribed practices, and attempt to
resolve some ambiguities in the statute. Various problems of assessing the
significance of the Act, among them its interaction with other consumer
statutes, will also be examined.
THE MARYLAND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
The need to provide adequate protection against unfair or deceptive
practices in consumer transactions 6 and to restore an undermined public
confidence in merchants,1 7 together with a realization that existing laws are
"inadequate, poorly coordinated and not widely known or adequately
enforced,"1 8 led the Maryland legislature to enact a comprehensive
Consumer Protection Act. 19 The intention of the legislature was to set
10. For example, statements or deceptive practices designed to induce consumers
to deal with a particular seller, other than statements about goods, would not be
covered by any traditional action.
11. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 106, at 695-98; James & Gray II, supra note 4,
at 523-27.
12. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 13-101 to -501 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
13. Ch. 704, 1974 Md. Laws 1484. The present version of the private cause of
action allows recovery to any person for "injury or loss sustained by him as the result
of a practice prohibited by this title." MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-408 (1975). The
prohibited practices are listed and defined in section 13-301 of the Act. Id. § 13-301
(1975 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
14. Id. § 13-301(3) (1975).
15. Id. § 13-301(2)(iXii).
16. Id. § 13-102(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
17. Id. § 13-102(b)(2).
18. Id. § 13-102(a)(2) (1975).
19. Id. §§ 13-101 to -501 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1979). The first major legislative
response to widespread deceptive trade practices was the 1938 Wheeler-Lea
Amendment to the Federal Trade Commission [hereinafter FTC] Act of 1914. FTC
Act, § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), Wheeler-Lea Amendment, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938), codified
in 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. 1978). For a discussion of the legislative history of
the Wheeler-Lea Amendment, see Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986,
992-97 (D.C. Cir. 1973). According to one commentator, this amendment "marked the
first real departure from the tradition of caveat emptor in consumer contract
administration." Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REV.
724, 728 (1972); see FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963). The
19791
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"minimum statewide standards for the protection of consumers."'2 To
accomplish this end, the General Assembly sought to implement strong
protective and preventive steps to investigate unlawful consumer practices,
2
'
central purpose of § 5(a) of the FTC Act is to abolish the rule of caveat emptor and to
replace it with the principle that consumers may rightfully expect that representa-
tions of fact are truthful.
Prior to the 1938 legislation, § 5 of the 1914 FTC Act was construed to prohibit
only unfair methods of competition, and functioned as an administrative remedy for
business competitors rather than for mere consumers. See FTC v. Raladom Co., 283
U.S. 643 (1931). The Wheeler-Lea Act conferred additional jurisdiction on the
Commission to proscribe "unfair or deceptive acts or practices," making proof of
adverse competitive impact unnecessary. Lovett, supra, at 728-29. Under the Wheeler-
Lea Amendment the emphasis shifted from "control of deceptive advertising practices
as an incident of antitrust regulation to the avowed purpose of protecting the
consumer from fraud." Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 994 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (footnote omitted).
The FTC Act, even as amended, was not intended to afford a mechanism for
the resolution of private disputes. See Eovaldi & Gestrin, Justice for Consumers: The
Mechanisms of Redress, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 281, 298 (1971). The Commission is
generally interested in practices that affect the public as a whole rather than the
individual consumer, Hill, Introduction to Consumer Protection Symposium, 8 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 609, 610-11 (1977), and the decision whether to act against an unlawful
act or pratice depends on whether such action would be in the "public interest." 15
U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970). E.g., FTC v. Raladom Co., 283 U.S. 643, 646-47 (1931); FTC v.
Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 28 (1929) ("the mere fact that it is to the interest of the
community that private rights shall be respected is not enough to support a finding of
public interest. To justify filing a complaint the public interest must be specific and
substantial."); 2 G. ROSDEN & P. RoSDEN, THE LAw OF ADVERTISING § 34.02[2] [b]
(1979). Although a minor limitation, in order for the FTC to act under § 5, unfair or
deceptive acts or practices must be "in or affecting" interstate commerce. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 45(a)(1), 46, 52 (1976).
The effectiveness of the FTC as an instrument for consumers to obtain redress
is limited by several other factors. Consumers injured by deceptive acts or practices do
not receive restitution when the FTC issues its standard sanction, the cease and desist
order. The enactment of the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act in 1975
increased the Commission's power to bring civil actions. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (1976)
(authority to seek civil penalties for violations of FTC rules and cease and desist
orders), id. § 57(b) (power to seek a variety of consumer redress orders); id. § 56 (power
to represent itself in civil proceedings). Section 57(b) has been subject to serious
interpretation problems and has rarely been used by the Commission since its
enactment. See generally Kintner & Westermeier, Obtaining Refunds For Consumers
Under Section 19 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1025
(1978).
No private cause of action is available under the Act. See Moore v. New York
Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 603 (1929); Alfred Dunhill Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 499
F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1974); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973). The FTC is unresponsive
to consumer complaints directed at acts or practices having only a localized effect,
Eovaldi & Gestrin, supra, at 299, and even when the Commission does act, there is
typically a three to five-year delay from the initial complaint to the final order, id.
20. MD. COM. Law CODE ANN. §§ 13-102(b)(1), -103(a) (1975).
21. Id. § 13-102(b)(3).
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to assist the public in obtaining relief from these practices, and to prevent
these practices from occurring in Maryland. 22
The Act prohibits certain unfair or deceptive practices in connection
with the provision of consumer credit, debts, goods, realty, and services. 23
"Consumers" include lessees and recipients of the covered items, as well as
actual and prospective purchasers.24 "Merchants" include direct or indirect
suppliers of consumer credit, debts, goods, realty, and services.2 5 Covered
transactions are broadly defined to include attempts to sell or otherwise
provide covered items, as well as consummated transactions. 26
There are three exemptions from the provisions of the Act. Companies
regulated by the Public Service Commission are not subject to its
provisions, 27 nor are advertising media broadcasting or printing the claims
of others.2 8 A third exemption covers professionals and quasi-
professionals,29 most of whom are required to obtain licenses to practice and
are otherwise regulated.3°
As an aid to interpretation of the Act, section 13-105 provides:
This title shall be construed and applied liberally to promote its
purpose. It is the intent of the General Assembly that in construing the
term unfair or deceptive trade practices, due consideration and weight
be given to the interpretations of §5(a) (1) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act by the Federal Trade Commission and the federal
courts.
3 1
This section provides guidance both by its mandate to construe the Act
broadly and in the direction to consider the body of law developed under the
Federal Trade Commission Act.32 In view of the absence of Maryland case
law interpreting the state act, the use of cases decided under the FTC Act as
an interpretive tool may be especially helpful.33
22.. Id.
23. Id. § 13-303 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
24. Id. § 13- 101(c).
25. Id. § 13- 101(g).
26. Id. § 13- 101(i).
27. Id. § 13-104(2) (1975).
28. Id. § 13-104(3).
29. Id. § 13-104(1).
30. Clergymen and Christian Science practitioners are the single exception to the
license requirement.
31. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-105 (1975).
32. See note 19 supra. This section further serves to assure businessmen that
Maryland law is similar to and complements the standards governing interstate
commerce. See Comment, Consumer Protection in Georgia: The Fair Business
Practices Act of 1975, supra note 2, at 455.
33. Case law developed under the FTC Act should not be regarded as binding
precedent on Maryland courts. Serious constitutional separation of powers issues
would be raised if the legislature purported to dictate to the courts that certain
statutory language should be construed in accordance with "precedent" newly
1979]
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The Act is administered by the Division of Consumer Protection of the
Department of Law. 34 The Division is given broad powers of enforcement,
including the powers to conduct investigations upon complaint or on its own
initiative;35 to conciliate disputes 36 or set up a program of voluntary
arbitration;37 to issue cease and desist orders;38 and to adopt reasonable
regulations and rules to carry out its provisions.
39
Upon complaint by a consumer, the Division conducts an investiga-
tion.40 If it finds reasonable grounds to believe a violation occurred, it must
try to reach a solution through conciliation. 41 Upon its own initiative, it may
hold a public hearing, with presentation of testimony under oath and
proceedings on the record, to determine whether a violation has occurred.
42
fashioned by the legislature. See MD. CONST., Decl. of Rts., art. 8. Provisions similar to
§ 13-105 in consumer protection legislation in other states have been interpreted to
treat constructions of the FTC Act as source material to guide rather than to bind
state courts. See Fitzgerald v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 46 Ill. 3d 526, 528, 361 N.E.2d
94, 96 (1977) (legislature lacks authority "to state explicitly how the judiciary shall
construe a statute."); State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 259, 275, 501
P.2d 290, 301 (1972).
34. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-201 (Cum. Supp. 1979). A nine-member
Consumer Council, with representatives of business and consumer interests and of the
public sector, advises on general goals, undertakes studies, and promotes cooperation
among various groups. Id. § 13-202 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
35. Id. § 13-204(1), -204(2). The Division also has authority to assess the costs of
its investigation and damages for failing to make proper restitution against a
violator. Id. § 13-204(10).
36. Id. §§ 13-204(3), -402.
37. Id. § 13-404(b) (1975). Under the arbitration rules set out in the Code of
Maryland Regulations, 1 COMAR 2.01.06 (1977), arbitration may occur only when the
Division determines there is a factual dispute, id. § 2.01.06.01, but may be requested by
either party or suggested by the Division after failure of direct negotiations, id.
§ 2.01.06.05.
38. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 13-204(4). -403 (1975). It may also, in
cooperation with the Department of Licensing, suspend or revoke the license of a
merchant who refuses to cease and desist. Id. § 13-204(5).
39. Id. § 13-204(12). Section 13-205 sets out the power to adopt and procedure for
adopting rules. Id. § 13-205. Rules may be adopted to assure orderly operation of the
Division and to define further unfair or deceptive trade practices. Id. § 13-204. They
may not, however, modify, expand, or conflict with the statutory definitions. Id.
§ 13-205(a)(2).
The Consumer Protection Division has adopted regulations relating to
retailers' refund policies, 1 COMAR 2.01.05 (1976), and invention development services,
id. 2.01.07 (1978). It has adopted rules providing for arbitration of consumer disputes,
id. 2.01.06 (1977), as well as procedural rules for cease and desist order hearings, id.
2.01.02 (1975).
40. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-401(b) (1975).
41. Id. § 13-402(a) (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1979). The terms of the conciliation agreed
to may be incorporated into a written agreement, id., and failure to adhere to its terms
is a violation of the Act, id. § 13-402(c) (1975).
Where violations are causing immediate, substantial, and irreparable injury,
is sought. See Devine Seafood, Inc. v. Attorney General, 37 Md. App. 439, 446-48, 377
A.2d 1194, 1197-99 (1977).
42. Id. § 13-403(a) (1975). It seems unlikely, in light of the mandatory conciliation
and voluntary arbitration procedures of the Act, that a single consumer's complaint
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If a violation is found, the Division states its findings and issues an order
requiring the violator to cease the violation and take affirmative action.4 3
The Attorney General is also authorized to seek an injunction to prohibit
continuation of a violation.44 Penalties imposed under the Act are primarily
civil,45 but criminal penalties may also be imposed.46
In addition to public enforcement proceedings, 47 any person may
institute a private action 48 and recover damages for injury or loss sustained
as a result of a prohibited practice as defined in section 13-301. 49 Due to its
potential impact on existing law and value as an enforcement mechanism,
the provision of a private cause of action is particularly significant.50
would reach the hearing stage. The fact that holding such a hearing is discretionary
with the Division, id., would make it likely the hearing will be reserved for violations
that are the subject of numerous complaints or that the Division itself investigates.
43. Id. § 13-403(b).
44. Id. § 13-406. A cease and desist hearing need not be held before the injunction
is sought. See Devine Seafood, Inc. v. Attorney General, 37 Md. App. 439, 446-48, 377
A.2d 1194, 1197-99 (1977).
45. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-410 (1975). A first offender is subject to a fine
of up to $300, id. § 13-410(a); and those who repeat the same violations are subject to a
$500 fine, id. § 13-410(b).
46. Id. § 13-411. Violation is a misdemeanor punishable by a $1,000 maximum
fine, imprisonment of up to a year, or both. Id. § 13-411(a). Imprisonment may not be
imposed for violation of an administrative order or for a unit pricing violation. Id.
§ 13-411(b).
47. See notes 40 to 44 and accompanying text supra.
48. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-408 (1975). Although § 13-401 provides a
mechanism for obtaining redress through Division agency enforcement procedures,
see id. § 13-401(e), an aggrieved consumer apparently need not pursue and exhaust
the remedies available through the Division of Consumer Protection before initiating
a private cause of action. Cf. Devine Seafood, Inc. v. Attorney General, 37 Md. App.
439, 445-48, 377 A.2d 1194, 1197-99 (1977) (the Attorney General need not attempt
conciliation as a condition precedent to seeking injunctive relief). See generally
Travers & Landers, The Consumer Class Action, 18 KAN. L. REv. 811, 812 (1970). A
person who decides to enforce his rights through the Division is not barred from
further action. If a consumer is "aggrieved by an order or decision of the Division, he
may institute any appropriate proceeding he considers necessary." MD. COM. LAW
CODE ANN. § 13-407 (1975).
49. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-301 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
50. A reading of § 13-302, which states that "[alny practice prohibited by this title
is a violation of this title, whether or not any consumer has in fact been mislead [sic],
deceived or damaged as a result of that practice," id. § 13-302 (1975) (emphasis
added), with § 13-408, which permits any person to "bring an action to recover for
injury or loss sustained by him as a result of a practice prohibited by this title," id.
§ 13-408 (emphasis added), seems to raise the question whether a consumer may
pursue a private cause of action even if he has not been damaged. This potential
conflict between sections illustrates the problems of construing a statute containing
public enforcement measures such as injunctions and cease and desist orders as well
as private causes of action. The apparent conflict stems from a legislative failure to
restrict the operation of various portions of the statute to remedies based on either
public or private action. Enjoining an activity that has not yet caused actual harm
seems entirely consistent with an important purpose of the Act, to prevent unfair or
1979]
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PROHIBITED PRACTICES5 1 UNDER THE ACT
Section 13-301, the substantive core of the Act, defines unfair 52 or
deceptive practices by a nonexclusive enumeration of twelve practices.5 3 For
the purpose of construing the section, these practices can be divided into
deceptive practices. See id. §13-102(b)(3). It is clearly contrary, however, to the
language of § 13-408 to permit a consumer a cause of action if no damages have been
sustained, and no legitimate legislative purpose would be served by such a reading.
Section 13-302 should be interpreted to pertain to enforcement action by the Attorney
General and the Division of Consumer Protection, and § 13-408 should be read to
control the elements necessary to establish a private cause of action.
51. Although the practices are discussed in the context of a civil cause of action,
no distinction is made in the statute between prohibited practices for civil and
criminal purposes.
52. Attention in this Comment has been primarily focused on acts or practices
that are deceptive. Unfair practices are also prohibited under the Act. In FTC v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972), the Supreme Court summarized the
factors the FTC considers in deciding whether an act or practice is unfair:
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously
considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by
statutes, the common law or otherwise - whether, in other words, it is within
the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of
unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous;
(3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other
businessmen).
Id. at 244 n.5 (quoting Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule 408,
Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health
Hazards of Smoking. 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (1964)). For a discussion of FTC
unfairness violations, see Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the
Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 680-85 (1977). As interpreted by the
Washington Supreme Court, an act which is illegal and against public policy is a per
se unfair trade practice. State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 259, 276, 501
P.2d 290, 301-02 (1972).
53. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-301 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The list of practices in
§ 13-301 only illustrates the types of practices that are unlawful. See Revisor's Note to
ch. 49, § 3, of the 1975 version of the Act, which states:
[T]he phrase "but not limited to" is deleted as unnecessary since use of the
word "include" is not intended in any sense to be exclusionary or limiting
.... The Commission emphasizes that neither its reorganization of this
section nor the deletion of the phrase "but not limited to" are intended in any
manner to make applicable the maxims of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, ejusdem generis or doctrines of similar implication. That these
doctrines were not intended by the General Assembly to apply to this section
is apparent from the declaration of findings, purpose, and legislative intent in
§§ 13-102 and 13-103, and more particularly, from the statement in § 13-105
that this title be "construed and applied liberally to promote its purpose."
Id. § 13-301 (1975).
Section 13-301 appears to be loosely based on § 2 of the Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, formulated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1964. Under the Uniform Act, twelve types of practices are
proscribed:
(a) A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of his
business, vocation, or occupation, he:
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three different types - a major subgroup pertaining to representations or
statements,54 two types of telephone solicitation practices,5 5 and several
(1) passes off goods or services as those of another;
(2) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source,
sponsorship approval or certification of goods or services;
(3) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affiliation,
connection, or association with, or certification by, another;
(4) uses deceptive representations or designations of geographic origin in
connection with goods or services;
(5) represents that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteris-
tics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quanitities that they do not have or that a
person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection that he
does not have;
(6) represents that goods are original or new if they are deteriorated, altered,
reconditioned, reclaimed, used, or second-hand;
(7) represents that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality or
grade or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another;
(8) disparages the goods, services, or business of another by false or
misleading representation of fact;
(9) advertises goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised;
(10) advertises goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably
expectable public demand, unless the advertisement discloses a limitation of
quantity;
(11) makes false or misleading statements of fact concerning the reasons for,
existence of, or amounts of price reductions, or
(12) engages in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of
confusion or of misunderstanding.
UNIFORM DEcEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT (1966 version).
In addition to the practices defined in § 13-301, the Maryland Act prohibits
referral sales, MD COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-304 (1975), and prizes conditioned on
purchases or sales promotions, id. § 13-305 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1979), and also
imposes affirmative duties owed to customers in certain other transactions. The
affirmative duties imposed by subtitle three include: provision of a certificate
guaranteeing that a gift or other inducement offered to a customer in exchange for
business will in fact be given to the customer, id. § 13-306 (1975); provision by a repair
company of a written bill containing specified information, id. § 13-307; labeling of
certain electrical products, id. §§ 13-308, -309; disclosure of the seating plan and
location of physical obstructions by sellers of reserved seat tickets, id. § 13-310;
prohibition of a service contract as prerequisite to a sale of merchandise, id. § 13-311
(Cum. Supp. 1979); notification to a credit card holder by the card issuer that the
issuer has been served with a subpoena for information relating to the holder's
account, id. § 13-312; and minimum standards for fire resistant insulating material,
id. § 13-313. Miscellaneous other consumer protection provisions are located in eleven
separate subtitles of title 14 of the Commercial Law Article.
54. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 13-301(1) to -301(9) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The
prohibited practices are:
(1) False, falsely disparaging, or misleading oral or written statement, visual
description, or other representation of any kind which has the capacity,
tendency, or effect of deceiving or misleading consumers;
(2) Representation that:
(i) Consumer goods, consumer realty, or consumer services have a sponsor-
ship, approval, accessory, characteristic, ingredient, use, benefit, or quantity
which they do not have;
(ii) A merchant has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connec-
tion which he does not have;
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miscellaneous violations of titles 13 and 14.56 Only the first subgroup is of
concern in this Comment.
Only three of the nine definitions in the first subgroup require proof of
scienter.5 7 The other six provisions apparently impose strict liability for
(iii) Deteriorated, altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, or secondhand consumer
goods are original or new; or
(iv) Consumer goods, consumer realty, or consumer services are of a
particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model which they are not;
(3) Failure to state a material fact if the failure deceives or tends to deceive;
(4) Disparagement of the goods, realty, services, or business of another by a
false or misleading representation of a material fact;
(5) Advertisement or offer of consumer goods, consumer realty, or consumer
services:
(i) Without intent to sell, lease, or rent them as advertised or offered; or
(ii) With intent not to supply reasonably expected public demand, unless the
advertisement or offer discloses a limitation of quantity or other qualifying
condition;
(6) False or misleading representation of fact which concerns:
(i) The reason for or the existence or amount of a price reduction; or
(ii) A price in comparison to a price of a competitor or to one's own price at a
past or future time;
(7) Knowingly false statement that a service, replacement, or repair is
needed;
(8) False statement which conerns the reason for offering or supplying
consumer goods, consumer realty, or consumer services at sale or discount
prices;
(9) Deception, fraud, false pretense, false premise, misrepresentation, or
knowing concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with the
intent that a consumer rely on the same in connection with:
(i) The promotion or sale of any consumer goods, consumer realty, or
consumer service; or
(ii) A contract or other agreement for the evaluation, perfection, marketing,
brokering or promotion of an invention; or
(iii) The subsequent performance of a merchant with respect to an agreement
of sale, lease, or rental.
55. Id. § 13-301(10), -301(11). Subsection (10) imposes affirmative identification
duties during the course of a solicitation by telephone. Unfair or deceptive trade
practices include:
(10) Solicitations of sales or services over the telephone without first clearly,
affirmatively, and expressly stating:
(i) The solicitor's name and the trade name of a person represented by the
solicitor;
(ii) The purpose of telephone conversation; and
(iii) The kind of merchandise, real property, intangibles, or service solicited;
Subsection (11) covers "[u]se of any plan or scheme in soliciting sales or services over
the telephone that misrepresents the solicitor's true status or mission."
56. Id. § 13-301(12). Subsection (12) was amended in 1979 to add deceptive
practices relating to kosher products to the list. Ch. 536, 1979 Md. Laws 1546.
57. MD. COM. LAW CODE Ann. § 13-301(5), -301(7), -301(9) (Cum. Supp. 1979). A
violation of the FTC Act may be established even though the defendant lacks scienter.
E.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1967). Scienter
might, however, be required in criminal cases. Cf. United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978) (element of criminal antitrust violation).
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false representations, a significant departure from common law tort actions
in which recovery of damages is generally possible only if the misrepre-
sentation is intentional.58 In instances of innocent misrepresentation a
consumer generally can only seek rescission of a contract, for recovery of
damages is subject to various limitations,59 although where a repre-
sentation constitutes a warranty a consumer may be able to recover for
breach in appropriate cases. 6° Section 13-301 represents a significant step
beyond even warranty liability, for the Act covers transactions involving
services, credit, and real property, as well as goods. It also prohibits a type
of misrepresentation not previously covered under any theory, misstate-
ments of a merchant's affiliation or a good's sponsorship.
61
Unfair or deceptive practices consisting of representations or statements
may be classified into two general categories: provisions in which repre-
sentations constitute per se unfair or deceptive trade practices, and
provisions that require proof of deception. A given fact situation may fall
within more than one subsection of a category, or may in fact be classified
under either category. The overlapping of various provisions may be a
source of possible confusion in construing this section. Of the nine
subsections defining deceptive or unfair trade practices in forms of repre-
sentations or statements, six do not require separate proof of deception,
62
and in this sense they may be categorized as per se unfair or deceptive trade
practices. In defining prohibited practices in terms that omit reference to
consumer deception, the legislature has substituted its judgment for that of a
court or jury with respect to certain types of misrepresentations deemed to be
inherently deceptive.
Five basic statutory terms applicable to provisions in the category of per
se unfair or deceptive trade practices may be identified: "falsity,"
"knowledge," "intent," "false or misleading," and "materiality. 6 3 The
subsections of section 13-301 are defined in terms of various combinations
of these elements. The most basic element of a per se unfair or deceptive
58. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 105, at 683-89.
59. See generally Hill, Breach of Contract as a Tort, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 40 (1974);
Hill, Damages for Innocent Misrepresentation, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1973); James
& Gray I, supra note 1, § 7.
60. See notes 5 to 8 and accompanying text supra.
61. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 13-301(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979). A significant
change is the provision prohibiting misleading omissions of material fact if they are
deceptive. Id. § 13-301(3). Omissions are also covered in subsection (9), although there
scienter is required. Id. § 13-301(9).
62. Subsections (2) and (8) clearly do not require proof of deception, the only
requirement being falsity of the statement. Id. § 13-301 (2), -301(8). Two subsections
requiring scienter on the part of the seller likewise do not seem to require proof of
deceptions. Id. § 13-301 (5), -301(7). Some parts of subsection (9) fall into this category
also. Two subsections prohibiting "false or misleading" statements, id. § 13-301 (4),
-301(6), do not require such proof where false statements are concerned, although they
may if "misleading" is interpreted to mean misleading to a particular consumer.
63. In interpreting these terms, reference will be made, where appropriate, to
common law concepts and to cases decided under the FTC Act.
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practice is a false representation. Subsections (2)64 and (8)65 of section
13-301 encompass untrue representations pertaining to nearly every
imaginable characteristic of consumer goods, realty, or services.66 Of the five
possible statutory components, falsity is the only element that must be
proved in every case in order to establish a prima facie unfair or deceptive
practice. With respect to the situations governed by these provisions, the
legislature has determined that untruth is inherently deceptive, and
consequently the plaintiff consumer may establish an unfair or deceptive
practice without proof of anything beyond damages and falsity of the repre-
sentation.
67
Since section 13-301 generally omits a scienter requirement, it becomes
especially important to determine whether a false representation has in fact
been made. The statute does not specify that representations be either oral
or written, and it may be possible to bring a cause of action under the Act
based on implied representations. An analysis of whether a representation
was made must proceed with an examination of the seller's portrayal of the
product, including the totality of the circumstances surrounding his
communication with the consumer, and thus the innuendo and illusion
surrounding the transaction may be as relevant as specific express
statements by the representer. 68 Two of the statutory provisions combine the
element of falsity with either a knowledge or an intent component. Section
13-301(7) is defined as a "[k]nowingly false statement that a service,
64. Subsection (2) includes any representation that:
(i) Consumer goods, consumer realty, or consumer services have a sponsor-
ship, approval, accessory, characteristic, ingredient, use, benefits, or quantity
which they do not have;
(ii) A merchant has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connec-
tion which he does not have;
(iii) Deteriorated, altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, or secondhand consumer
goods are original or new; or
(iv) Consumer goods, consumer realty, or consumer services are of a
particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model which they are not.
MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-301(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
65. Subsection (8) encompasses any "[flalse statement which conerns the reason
for offering or supplying consumer goods, consumer realty, or consumer services at
sale or discount prices." Id. § 13-301(8).
66. Another type of false statement or misrepresentation is found in § 13-301(11).
This subsection is similar to the type of representation defined in § 13-301(2)(ii), but is
different in not being addressed to merchants, and in its specific concern with the
method of misrepresentation. This subsection includes "[u]se of any plan or scheme in
soliciting sales or services over the telephone that misrepresents the solicitor's true
status or mission." Id. § 13-301 (11).
67. In establishing a private cause of action pursuant to § 13-408, a plaintiff must
allege facts sufficient to show that an unfair or deceptive trade practice exists under
§ 13-301, and then must allege a violation of § 13-303. Section 13-303 functions to
prohibit "any unfair or deceptive trade practice, as defined in this subtitle or as
further defined by the Division." Id. § 13-303.
68. See Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine,
Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109 (1974).
[VOL. 38
MARYLAND'S CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
replacement, or repair is needed[.] ' '6 9 In requiring a mental element, the
legislature probably intended to insulate from liability persons who make
inadvertent or mistaken diagnoses that services or repairs are needed. The
other type of representation or statement conjoined with a mental element is
found in section 13-301(5). This section defines an unfair or deceptive trade
practice as an advertisement or offer of consumer goods, realty, or services
without the intent to comply with the terms of the offer or advertisement, or
with intent not to supply reasonably expected public demand.70 The addition
of an intent element for these two practices 71 probably represents a
legislative judgment that an inability either to comply with the terms of an
advertisement or to supply public demand may be explained by legitimate
business reasons.
An intermediate category of unlawful practices must be discussed. This
category is labeled intermediate because the term "misleading" is used in
conjunction with falsity, and, depending on the type of misrepresentation, a
consumer may elect to establish that the representation was either false or
misleading. If a plaintiff elects to prove falsity, then the unlawful practice
may appropriately be characterized as per se deceptive.72 In instances,
however, in which the plaintiff chooses to prove that the representation was
misleading, the consumer must establish that he was led into a mistaken
belief through defendant's deception. 73 There are two unlawful practices in
69. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 13-301 (7) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
70. Section 13-301(5) includes any advertisement or offer of consumer goods,
consumer realty, or consumer services:
(i) without intent to sell, lease, or rent them as advertised or offered; or
(ii) with intent not to supply reasonably expected public demand, unless the
advertisement or offer discloses a limitation of quantity or other qualifying
condition.
Id. § 13-301(5).
71. Section 13-104(3), the general exemption provision, refers to another category
of activity that is prohibited if the requisite mental state exists. Advertising media are
immune from liability arising out of advertisements that violate the Act "unless the
station, publisher, or printer engages in an unfair or deceptive trade practice in the
sale of its own goods or services or has knowledge that the advertising is in violation
of this title." Id. § 13-104 (emphasis added).
72. See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
73. Under the FrC Act, the terms "misleading" and "deceptive" appear to be
synonymous. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
("[A]dvertisements may be deceptive if they have a tendency and capacity to convey
misleading impressions to consumers even though other non-misleading interpreta-
tions may also be possible."); FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir.
1963) (capacity to deceive defined in terms of "a likelihood or fair probability that the
reader will be misled."). Under 15 U.S.C. § 52(b) the dissemination of a false
advertisement is an unfair or deceptive act or practice under 15 U.S.C. § 45. False
advertisement is defined as:
an advertisement, other than labeling, which is misleading in a material
respect; and in determining whether any advertisement is misleading, there
shall be taken into account (among other things) not only representations
made or suggested by statement, word, design, device, sound, or any
combination thereof, but also the extent to which the advertisement fails to
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this intermediate category. Section 13-301(6) encompasses false or mislead-
ing representations of fact that pertain to "(i) [t]he reason for or the
existence or amount of a price reduction; or (ii) [a] price in comparison to a
price of a competitor or to one's own price at a past or future time. '7 4 The
second definition in this category is aimed at "[d]isparagement of the goods,
realty, services, or business of another . . .,75
Use of the phrase "false or misleading representation of fact" in section
13-301(6) may raise the question of the applicability of a common law
defense to a consumer protection private action. 76 Under the Maryland
common law of deceit, a false representation must be one of past or existing
fact, not opinion, promise, or expectation unless the promise is made with
the intention of not performing it.77 Representations asserted as statements
of fact pertaining to quality and condition may constitute fraud. Fraud may
also be established if the defendant prevents the plaintiff from investigation
of conditions, or when the facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the
defendant and difficult for the plaintiff to ascertain, as where the misrepre-
sentations relate to latent defects.78 As a result of this fact-opinion
distinction, certain representations are not actionable under common law
fraud because they are considered "puffing. ' '79 The theory underlying the
reveal facts material in the light of such reprsentations or material with
respect to consequences which may result from the use of the commodity to
which the advertisement relates under the conditions prescribed in said
advertisement, or under such conditions as are customary or usual.
15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) (1976). Intent to deceive is unnecessary to support a deceptive
advertising charge. See, e.g., Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977); Doherty, Clifford, Steers & Shenfield, Inc. v. FTC, 392
F.2d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 1968); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666, 670 (7th
Cir. 1967).
74. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 13-301(6) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
75. Id. §13-301(4). The disparagement practice, unlike the "price" practice,
explicitly requires that such representations of fact be material. Id.
76. Three other definitions of unfair or deceptive trade practices are also
expressly phrased in terms of representations of fact. Id. § 13-301(3), -301(4), -301(9).
The considerations mentioned in the text accompanying this note are similarly
applicable to these other subsections.
77. Appel v. Hupfield, 198 Md. 374, 382, 84 A.2d 94, 97 (1951). See James & Gray
II, supra note 4, § 8. For a discussion of the distinction between fact and opinion, see
P. Keeton, Fraud: Misrepresentations of Opinion, 21 MINN. L. REv. 643, 656-58 (1937).
78. Fowler v. Benton, 229 Md. 571, 579, 185 A.2d 344, 349-50 (1962).
79. Appel v. Hupfield, 198 Md. 374, 379-80, 84 A.2d 94, 96 (1951). Plaintiff claimed
that the defendants listed their house at $5,500 although it was only worth $4,000. The
court stated:
It is common knowledge that owners and agents often place an exaggerated
value on property which they are trying to sell. Statements as to value of
property made by an owner or agent seeking to dispose of it by sale or
exchange are generally regarded as mere commendatory statements, "dealer's
talk," or "puffing," and cannot form the basis of a charge of fraud.
Id. The court described a representation of value as an expression of opinion, upon
which a person is not entitled to rely. Id. at 380, 84 A.2d at 97. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTs § 542 (1977).
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common law "puffing" defense is that no reasonable man would believe the
statement to be true and accordingly would not rely on it in making a
purchase.c° Traditional common law assumptions about the nature of a
reasonable man, however, are affected by one of the fundamental premises
of consumer protection legislation - that the law is designed to protect
ignorant and credulous consumers, who are often influenced by appearances
and general impressions. 81 The standard of care necessary to defeat a
"puffing" defense under the FTC Act may be explained as less than the
traditional reasonable man standard, or perhaps as the reasonably
vulnerable consumer. A representation may be deemed to be deceptive even
if a reasonable or intelligent person would not have been deceived, and a
private cause of action based on the Consumer Protection Act would be
immune from a contributory negligence defense that could be raised in a
common law deceit action in Maryland.82 Under the FTC Act the common
law distinction between misrepresentations of fact and opinion has been
largely ignored in determining whether deception has occurred.8 3 Further-
more, a statement may be deemed to have the capacity to deceive 4 even if a
qualification to the "misrepresentation" has been made, so long as it is less
conspicuous than the deceptive statement.85
80. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 109. See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 542 (1938).
81. E.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1945); Gelb v. FTC, 144
F.2d 580, 582 (2d Cir. 1944); Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942);
Moretrench Corp. v. FTC, 127 F.2d 792, 795 (2d Cir. 1942); General Motors Corp. v.
FTC, 114 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 682 (1941). See Millstein, The
Federal Trade Commission and False Advertising, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 439, 458-62
(1964). Under the FTC Act the standard for deception is measured by the average,
ordinary people to whom a representation is addressed, many of whom are
unsophisticated. See Exposition Press, Inc. v. FrC, 295 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 917 (1962); Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 887 (9th Cir. 1960); Ford
Motor Co., v. FrC, 120 F.2d 175, 182 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668 (1941); 2 G.
ROSDEN & P. ROSDEN, supra note 19, § 18.02[1] (1979); Pitofsky, supra note 52, at
675-79; Thain, Advertising Regulation: The Contemporary FTC Approach, 1
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 349, 381-84 (1973). "If an advertisement is capable of being
interpreted in more than one way and one of those interpretations is false and likely
to mislead a substantial portion of consumers, the advertisement is unlawful under
§ 5." Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 977, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. dismissed, 376
U.S. 967 (1964).
82. See, e.g., Boulden v. Stilwell, 100 Md. 543, 60 A. 609 (1905); Comment, Deceit
and Negligent Misrepresentation in Maryland, 35 MD. L. REV. 651, 670-71 (1976).
83. See, e.g., Erickson v. FTC, 272 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
940 (1960); Wybrant Sys. Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 266 F.2d 571 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 883 (1959).
84. Under consumer protection legislation, a practice is prohibited if the
"misrepresentation" taken as a whole has the capacity or tendency to deceive. See,
e.g., Speigel, Inc. v. FTC, 411 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1969); Murray Space Shoe Corp. v.
FTC, 304 F.2d 270, 272 (2d Cir. 1962); Elliot Knitwear, Inc. v. FTC, 266 F.2d 787, 790
(2d Cir. 1959).
85. Giant Food, Inc. v. FrC, 322 F.2d 977, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. dismissed, 376
U.S. 967 (1964); Metal Stamping Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 33 F.2d 411, 412 (7th
Cir. 1929).
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The second category of representations or statements in section 13-301
contains two non per se practices that expressly require proof of "tendency"
or effect of deception.86 The first such practice, section 13-301(1), in some
respects a category likely to overlap with many others, includes "[f]alse,
falsely disparaging, or misleading oral or written statement, visual
description, or other representations of any kind which has the capacity,
tendency, or effect of deceiving or misleading consumers. T8 7 In sum, in the
category of non per se unfair or deceptive practices, unlike per se practices, it
is necessary for a consumer to establish that a representation has the
capacity or tendency to deceive, proof of a statutory term that is
unnecessary when establishing mere falsity for per se deceptive practices.
Both of the provisions include the term "tendency" to deceive, 88 suggesting
that a consumer need not establish that he was actually deceived in order to
recover in a private cause of action. When a consumer has been damaged by
a section 13-301 practice, however, he must in fact have been deceived.8 9
The issue of how "tendency" should be construed illustrates the problems of
a single statutory definition enforced by both public and private mecha-
nisms.90 Under the FTC Act it is well settled that the Commission need only
establish capacity to deceive, not actual deception, in order to find an
advertisement deceptive. 91 The reason for this rule helps to explain why the
capacity to deceive standard would generally be inappropriate to private
causes of action based on violations of section 13-301. The Commission's
orders are designed to prevent future illegal practices rather than to afford
compensatory damages or impose punishment.92 In other words, "[d]ecep-
tion itself is the evil the statute is designed to prevent";93 the absence of
injury does not mean that there is no deception.
86. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-301(1), -301(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
87. Id. § 13-301(1).
88. Section 13-301(3) also contains the term "capacity" to deceive. Id. § 13-301(3).
89. To the extent that a consumer did not actually suffer damages caused by a
representation that merely had the tendency to deceive, it appears that a consumer
could not establish a private cause of action under § 13-408, which allows recovery for
"injury or loss sustained." Id. § 13-408 (1975).
90. See note 50 supra.
91. E.g., Thiret v. FTC, 512 F.2d 176, 180 (10th Cir. 1975); Spiegel v. FTC, 494 F.2d
59, 63 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974).
92. Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 896 (9th Cir. 1960).
93. Spiegel v. FTC, 494 F.2d 59, 63 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 (1974)(quoting Florsheim v. FTC, 411 F.2d 874, 878 (9th Cir. 1969)). Apparently because of
the importance placed on private causes of action supplementing state enforcement
programs, one court has utilized a capacity to deceive test for a private cause of
action. See Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 554 P.2d 349
(1976).
Section 13-301(3) contains the language "tends to deceive" but does not refer
to the deception of more than one consumer. It is therefore doubtful whether a
capacity to deceive test would be applicable to a private cause of action based on a
violation of this subsection.
Section 13-301(1) not only contains capacity to deceive language, but of the
twelve independent unfair or deceptive practices defined in § 13-301, it is the only
subsection that requires that consumers, rather than an individual consumer, be
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The statutory subsections requiring proof of deception appear to require
proof that the defendant either caused the plaintiff to believe in a falsehood
or failed to fulfill the plaintiffs expectations that were caused by the
defendant's representation or statement. Defined in terms of a failure to
inform, the first and simplest form of non per se unfair or deceptive practice
is a "[flailure to state a material fact if the failure deceives or tends to
deceive." 94 This section departs from the Maryland common law rule that
mere silence or nondisclosure of material facts is generally insufficient to
constitute actionable fraud.9 5 Under common law theories, a duty to disclose
deceived. The presence of this plural language may mean one of two things. The pres-
ence of the word consumers, in conjunction with the capacity or tendency language,
arguably evidences a legislative intent to limit subsection (1) to purely public
enforcement measures. More plausibly, however, subsection (1), in the absence of
express language restricting its scope to public enforcement devices, should be read to
require the injured plaintiff to establish that such practice has the capacity to deceive
other consumers. In deciding whether a representation has the capacity to deceive, the
FTC measures its effect on the average individual. E.g., Korber Hats, Inc. v. FTC, 311
F.2d 358, 360-62 (1st Cir. 1962); Ward Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952,954 (2d
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1961). Although the claim would not deceive the
average consumer, it could deceive a group particularly susceptible to such repre-
sentations. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
The plural language might be seen as evidence of a legislative intent to adopt
a capacity to deceive test for a private cause of action based on this subsection
because of a policy favoring enforcement of the Act by "private attorneys general"
especially when more than one consumer is affected by an unfair or deceptive trade
practice. The absence of capacity to deceive language from other sections, however, in
conjunction with language referring to more than one consumer, makes it likely that
the capacity to deceive standard is inapplicable to private causes of action. The
remedy allowed by § 13-408, in the absence of other indicators of legislative intent,
appears to have merely a compensatory, not a deterrent or preventative, function.
94. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 13-301(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
95. See, e.g., Walsh v. Edwards, 233 Md. 552, 557, 197 A.2d 424, 427 (1964) (seller
of real property not obligated to disclose the undesirable features of property offered
for sale, even if nondisclosure relates to material facts; but duty to disclose arises
upon active misstatement of fact or partial statement of fact); Fegeas v. Sherrill, 218
Md. 472, 474-80, 147 A.2d 223, 225-27 (1958) (nondisclosure of termite damage is
insufficient to justify damages or rescission of a contract to purchase a house).
Compare id. with Fowler v. Benton, 229 Md. 571, 185 A.2d 344 (1962), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 845 (1963). Defendant represented that the Health Department installed a septic
system but failed to disclose the system's inadequacy. The court held that although
mere nondisclosure absent some special duty to speak is insufficient to show fraud, a
partial statement of facts which could mislead due to an omission may constitute
fraud. Id. at 582, 185 A.2d at 351. See also P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52, 58 (4th
Cir. 1950) (duty to disclose arises if necessary to cure any misconception that could
result from propositions stated); Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36, 43 (D.C. Cir.)
(Bazelon J., dissenting), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 818 (1950). Under constructions of the
FTC Act, examples of the duty to disclose include adequate disclosure of the prior use
of a product, Double Eagle Lubricants, Inc. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 268, 269-70 (10th Cir.
1965); a danger that might result from the use of the product, American Medicinal
Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 136 F.2d 426, 427 (9th Cir. 1943); a product's composition if it has
been changed, Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC, 281 F. 744, 748-50 (2d Cir. 1922); or
is different than its appearance, Theodore Kagen Corp. v. FTC, 283 F.2d 371, 371 (D.C.
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961).
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is imposed in only a few special instances, such as transactions involving
fiduciary relationships. 96 The rationale is that in ordinary arm's length
bargaining situations the purchaser has ample opportunity to ascertain
relevant facts. 97 Consumer protection legislation, however, is predicated on a
"recognition of the unequal bargaining power of opposing forces in the
marketplace" 98 and imposes a greater duty of disclosure to compensate for
the general inability of consumers to protect themselves against deception.99
In order to avoid liability, a representer must not only make careful use of
his language, he must also attempt to perceive the consumer's comprehen-
sion of a proposed transaction in order to discern when disclosure is
required. The representer's burden may be further increased by an
assumption similar to that made under the FTC Act, that the relevant
standard of comprehension is not that of the traditional reasonable man,
but that of the reasonably vulnerable consumer. 1 0
In order to trigger the disclosure requirements of section 13-301(3), it is
necessary that the defendant fail to state a material fact.1 1 In a common
law fraud suit a materiality requirement also must be met.1 2 The materiality
element in section 13-301(3) can best be explained by comparing it to the
causation requirement under section 13-408. Generally, as a matter of
causation, a consumer must prove actual reliance upon a representation. To
further establish that the representation was of material fact, a consumer
must prove that his reliance was justifiable, that a reasonably vulnerable
consumer would have acted upon the representation. 10 3 The requirement of
materiality ensures that insignificant misstatements or omissions are not
the basis for a claim for damages or rescission of a contract. Traditionally,
a fact is considered "material" if its existence or nonexistence is "a matter to
which a reasonable man would attach importance in determining his choice
of action in a transaction, or [if] the maker of the representation knows that
its recipient is likely to regard the fact as important although a reasonable
96. See, e.g., Fowler v. Benton, 229 Md. 571, 581, 185 A.2d 344, 351 (1962); Fegeas
v. Sherrill, 218 Md. 472, 475-77, 147 A.2d 223, 225-26 (1958).
97. Fegeas v. Sherrill, 218 Md. at 477, 147 A.2d at 226.
98. Commonwealth by Cremer v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 458,
329 A.2d 812, 816 (1974).
99. Courts have recognized the adverse effects of mass media advertising with its
"highly developed arts of persuasion." See, e.g., J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d
884, 890 (6th Cir. 1967).
100. See note 81 supra.
101. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 13-301(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
102. James & Gray II, supra note 4, § 9. Issues of materiality and causation are
ignored by the Commission under the FrC Act. If an advertisement is found to be
misleading, the Commission need only show capacity to deceive and to affect a
purchasing decision. See note 91 supra. See also FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380
U.S. 374, 391-92 (1965); J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884, 889-90 (6th Cir. 1967).
103. James & Gray II, supra note 4, § 9.
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man would not so regard it."104 Construction of the three subsections
specifying a materiality requirement 10 5 should give weight to decisions
under the FTC Act recognizing that because it was designed to protect the
gullible as well as the cautious, 10 6 a determination of materiality should
depend on the maker's actual knowledge of what is important to the
recipient or what would be important to a reasonably vulnerable consu-
mer. 1
0 7
104. Brodsky v. Hull, 196 Md 509, 516, 77 A.2d 156, 159 (1950). See Bobb v.
Bolyard, 194 Md. 603, 609, 72 A.2d 13, 16 (1950) (representation material if without it a
transaction would not have taken place). The Restatement (Second) of Torts considers
a matter material if:
a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or non existence in
determining his choice of action in the transaction in question ... or ... the
maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that its recipient
regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in determining his
choice of action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977).
105. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-301 (3), -301(4), -301(9) (Cum. Supp 1979). In
light of the express requirement of materiality in these provisions of § 13-301, it is
possible to infer that this requirement need not be met to establish practices where
this term is omitted. In deciding whether to construe the subsections of § 13-301 to
contain an implied materiality component when materiality is not explicitly required,
due weight should be given to an important policy consideration. Analogizing to
common law doctrine, the materiality element in a fraud suit functions to ensure a
minimum amount of stability in business transactions. James & Gray II, supra note
4, § 9, at 500. A claim of fraud or deception may often be made by the dissatisfied party
to the transaction, and frequently such disappointments are unrelated to any
misrepresentations that may have been made during the course of negotiations. Id.
Concern for business stability may be given due weight without infringing on the
broad purposes of the Consumer Protection Act, because the standard of materiality
allows recovery in many instances in which reliance would be deemed to be
unjustified under the objective common law standard. See note 80 supra.
An element of materiality may be inferred from the nature of the types of
unfair or deceptive practices set forth in § 13-301, many of which arguably apply to
situations in which representations would likely be inherently material. An example
of how the Act differs from traditional concepts of materiality is the liability of a
seller for an erroneous estimate of a quantity of land. The Court of Appeals decided in
Brodsky v. Hull, 196 Md. 509, 77 A.2d 156 (1950), that a quantity of land estimate
which differs from true quantity is not material because the buyer had the risk of
accuracy. The Act apparently leads to a different result. Section 13-301(2) specifically
prohibits a representation that consumer goods, services or realty has a "sponsorship,
approval, necessary, characteristic ingredient, use, benefit, or quantity which they do
not have." MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-301(2)(i) (Cum. Supp. 1979) (emphasis
added).
106. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
107. See Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F.73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910). See also
Gulf Oil Corp. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1945); Charles of the Ritz Distribs.
Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir. 1944). There are limitations on the extent of
the protection offered to the ignorant or feeble-minded under the FTC Act:
True, as has been reiterated many times, the Commission's responsibility is to
prevent deception of the gullible and credulous, as well as the cautious and
knowledgeable .... This principle loses its validity, however, if it is applied
uncritically or pushed to an absurd extreme. An advertiser cannot be charged
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A second type of non per se unfair or deceptive practice is found in
section 13-301(9). This section broadly applies to sales or promotions, 08 and
to the "subsequent performance of a merchant with respect to an agreement
of sale, lease, or rental."'1 9 Included within this practice is "[d]eception,
fraud, false pretense, false premise, misrepresentation, or knowing conceal-
ment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with the intent that a
consumer rely on the same . . . ."110 This provision in essence provides a
basis for recovery for certain types of representations or omissions that lead
a consumer to believe justifiably or expect something is true that is not in
fact "true." Not only are the basic elements of the two preceding non per se
practices combined - "falsity" and "misleading" - this subsection also
includes an element that the representer intend for the consumer to rely on
the representation or omission.
It should be recognized that interpretation of the nine preceding unfair
or deceptive practices must overcome a certain inherent ambiguity in section
13-301. Section 13-301 is structured as a list of various prohibited practices;
each of its subsections constitutes an independent type of a deceptive
practice. This structuring suggests that an aggrieved consumer may recover
upon proof of any one of nine possible unfair or deceptive practices based on
representations or statements. A closer examination of the language of each
provision, however, reveals that many of the requisite proof requirements
differ according to a particular factual context. If each provision is assumed
to embody a legislative response to a particular factual setting, the language
chosen by the legislature in imposing various elements of proof in particular
fact situations must be assumed to be intentional, and this section should
not, if possible, be construed in a manner that would ignore such language.
This could result if one of the general provisions of section 13-301 were
applied to a fact situation that appears to call for application of a specific
subsection with specific elements of proof.
with liability in respect of every conceivable misconception, however
outlandish, to which his representations might be subject among the foolish
or feeble minded. Some people, because of ignorance or incomprehension, may
be misled by even a scrupulously honest claim. Perhaps a few misguided souls
believe, for example, that all "Danish pastry" is made in Denmark. Is it,
therefore, an actionable deception to advertise "Danish pastry" when it is
made in this country? Of course not. A representation does not become "false
or deceptive" merely because it will be unreasonably misunderstood by an
insignificant and unrepresentative segment of the class of persons to whom
the representation is addressed.
In re Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1290 (1963), aff'd sub nom. Kirchner v. FTC, 337 F.2d
751 (9th Cir. 1964). See also In re Papercraft Corp., 63 F.T.C. 1965, 1993 (1963). For a
critical discussion of the evolution of the "standard of perception" employed by the
Commission, see 2 G. ROSDEN & P. ROSDEN, supra note 19, 18.02.
108. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 13-301(9) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
109. Id. § 13-301(9)(iii). Subsection (9) also is directed at "a contract or other
agreement for the evaluation, perfection, marketing, brokering or promotion of an
invention." Id. § 13-301(9)(ii).
110. Id. § 13-301(9).
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The problem can be seen by contrasting the provisions containing a
scienter element with provisions lacking such element. In addition to proof
of a false representation with regard to a service or repair, or in the course of
an advertisement or offer, subsections 13-301(5) and (7) impose, respectively,
intent and knowledge elements. If a consumer is unable to prove the
required mental element, recovery will be denied unless section 13-301(1) is
given effect.
Deciding which provision should be given effect involves competing
considerations. On the one hand, if the broad scope of section 13-301(1) is
not given effect, then, contrary to legislative purpose, consumers unable to
establish the requisite mental element will be denied recourse against an
unfair or deceptive trade practice. On the other hand, if the broad provision
is given effect in a situation to which the legislature intended to impose
additional specific elements of proof, then such specific provisions will be
reduced to surplusage. In view of the fact that this section should be broadly
construed to promote its purpose, in the absence of explicit language
restricting the scope of section 13-301(1), conflict between the general
provision which would allow relief and specific provisions which would deny
relief should be resolved in favor of allowing consumer recovery under the
general provision. To the extent that a practice contains particularly
stringent proof requirements, as section 13-301(9) does, it would appear a
fortiori that it too must not be given effect over a provision which would
provide a basis for relief.
POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON THE SCOPE OF THE
PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION
The definition of prohibited activity in section 13-301 in terms of
"practices1 11 may, by negative inference, impose a restriction on a
consumer's cause of action. Although in the majority of other states 12 and
111. Id. § 13-301.
112. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471 (Cum. Supp. 1979); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1522
(1967); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 70-904 to -906 (Cum. Supp. 1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-110b (West Cum. Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501-204 (West Cum. Supp. 1979);
IDAHO CODE § 48-603 (1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-626 (1976); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 51:1405 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2 (1972 & Cum. Supp.
1979); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.903 (Cum. Supp. 1979); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 75-24-5 (Cum. Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 85-402 (Cum. Supp. 1977);
NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 598.410. 598A.060 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:2 (Supp.
1975); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 349 (McKinney's Cur. Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 75-1.1 (1975 Repl. Vol.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-15-02 (1974); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1345.02 (Page Supp. 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-3 (Purdon Cur. Supp. 1979);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-2 (1970); S.C. CODE § 39-5-20 (1976 & Cur. Supp. 1978); S.D.
COD. LAWS §§ 37-24-5.3 to -24-5.6, -24-6 (1977); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46
(Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-4 (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9, § 2453 (1971 & Cum. Supp. 1979); VA. CODE § 59.1-200 (Cum. Supp. 1979); WAsH.
REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (1978); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-104 (1976).
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in the FTC Act,' 13 the term "practice" is used disjunctively with the word
"act," Maryland's Consumer Protection Act omits the latter term. It may be
that omission of the word "act" from the prohibited trade activity in section
13-301 evidences an intent to narrow the scope of the Act's application. The
word "practice" generally connotes repeated or habitual activity and implies
uniformity and continuity rather than isolated activity or a single
occurrence. 14 In construing an unrelated statute, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland has held that the term "practice" necessarily implied an act often
repeated by the same person, or a succession of acts of a similar kind or like
employment.' 1 5
If section 13-301 is construed to define prohibited activity that must be
more than mere isolated acts, an aggrieved consumer must prove not only
that he was damaged by an unfair or deceptive act but also that the
defendant pursued the same course of conduct as a matter of practice. Such
a construction would allow a potential violator, in effect, one and perhaps
more wrongs before liability could be imposed. Indeed, if deceptive acts are
outside the ambit of section 13-301, then a person could make use of
hundreds of different schemes, so long as each scheme was employed only
once. The absurdity of the "practice" limitation lies in the practical
necessity of proving not only one's own cause of action, but also a series of
other consumers' causes of action as well.
The language of section 13-301 supports the conclusion that the
omission of the word "act" should not be construed to preclude a private
cause of action for an unfair or deceptive act. The deceptive practices in
subsections (1) through (9) are not defined in terms of repeated or continuous
activity but rather in terms of single representations or statements; upon
proof of one of the prohibited representations, a consumer is entitled to bring
a cause of action pursuant to section 13-308.116 In view of the language of
section 13-301, and in recognition of the consequences contrary to
legislative purpose that would result if the term were construed otherwise,
113. 15 U.S.C. §45(2)(1) (1970).
114. The term "practice" has been defined as "[r]epeated or customary action;
habitual performance; a succession of acts of similar kind; custom; usage." BLAcK's
LAW DICTIONARY 1055 (5th ed. 1979).
115. West v. Sun Cab Co., 160 Md. 476, 479, 154 A. 100, 103 (1931) (quoting 3 Bouv.
LAw DICT. 2650 Rawles' ed. 3rd rev.). The court interpreted a statute authorizing the
Public Service Commission to determine regulations, practices and services with
respect to transportation of persons, Code. Pub. Gen. Laws art. 23, § 373 (1924), in
holding that an order requiring taxicab owners to carry indemnity insurance did not
establish a "practice" within the Code.
116. In Spradling v. Williams, 553 S.W.2d 143, 146 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), the court
referred to individual prohibited acts under the Texas Consumer Protection Act as
instances of deceptive trade practices. See Bell v. Kent-Brown Chevrolet Co., 1 Kan.
App. 131, 561 P.2d 907 (1977) (recovery given to consumer against dealer-seller of a
van under an act which prohibits deceptive practices).
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the term unfair or deceptive "practice" should be read to include isolated
acts.
1 1 7
A second possible limitation on the scope of the Maryland Consumer
Protection Act may result from reliance upon decisions rendered under the
FTC Act. ' 8 A consumer's right to relief in a private cause of action arguably
may be limited by the imposition of a condition precedent that the unfair or
deceptive trade practice be against the "public interest.'19 The applicability
of such a condition raises a fundamental issue of statutory construction -
the proper use of section 13-105.120 This section, intended to serve as an aid
to proper construction of the term "unfair or deceptive practices," states that
the General Assembly intended "due consideration and weight be given to
the interpretations of section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act by
the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts."'' Cases decided
under the FTC Act uniformly require the existence of a public interest to
justify an agency complaint. In FTC v. Klesner,'2 2 the Supreme Court first
articulated this requirement, explaining that the "mere fact that it is to the
interest of the community that private rights shall be respected is not
enough to support a finding of public interest. To justify filing a complaint
the public interest must be specific and substantial."'"'
Several factors support the conclusion that a public interest requirement
should not be read into the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. First, there
is no language requiring a showing of public interest in the sections relevant
to both private and public remedies offered in the Act. The only possible
origin of a public interest condition would be from reliance upon FTC
decisions.' 24 The FTC Act, however, is enforceable solely through agency
public enforcement mechanisms,125 while the Maryland Act combines public
enforcement with a private cause of action. This difference provides the
basis for understanding why a public interest requirement is justifiably a
prerequisite of FTC action, but not of the Maryland consumer's right to
117. A contrary construction would be possible, and might well be necessary, if the
Maryland Act provided for only public enforcement mechanisms. Limited resources
would be best devoted to prosecution of habitual or repeated violators and would serve
the Act's purposes. The statutory direction in § 13-105 to construe "unfair or deceptive
trade practices" in a manner similar to the construction of those terms under the FTC
Act, given congruity in such a case with the FrC Act, would be likely to mandate the
result.
This problem illustrates the difficulties encountered in construing a statute
providing for public and private enforcement when the ends to be served by each may
differ.
118. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)(1970).
119. See note 19 supra.
120. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 13-105 (1975); see note 31 and accompanying text
supra.
121. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 13-105 (1975).
122. 280 U.S. 19 (1929).
123. Id. at 28.
124. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 13-105 (1975); see note 19 supra.
125. See note 19 supra.
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private relief. 26 The purpose of the public interest requirement is to ensure
that the FTC does not dissipate its limited budgetary resources by
attempting to issue complaints against comparatively trivial unfair or
deceptive trade practices involving few people and insubstantial amounts of
damages.' 27 Such a resource allocation device has no place in an
enforcement remedy that makes use of a private cause of action. 12
Failure to recognize the purpose of the public interest requirement in
FTC decisions may explain another jurisdiction's adoption of this require-
ment for private causes of action under its state consumer protection act. In
Lightfoot v. MacDonald29 the Supreme Court of Washington became one of
the first jurisdictions to address the issue whether proof of public interest is
prerequisite to relief in a private cause of action under Washington's
consumer protection act. 13 In Lightfoot, the plaintiff sued her attorney for
failure to properly advise her with respect to a threatened mortgage
foreclosure. Because the plaintiff failed to show that her attorney's conduct,
which damaged no one but herself, had sufficient impact upon the public,
the court held that the complaint had been properly dismissed. 13'
In concluding that a showing of "public interest" was required, the court
relied on the legislative declaration of purpose in the Washington act and, in
accordance with a statutory mandate that construction of the Act be guided
by FTC interpretations, on FTC v. Klesner.1 32 The court stated that because
the purpose of the Act is to "protect the public," the legislature, in providing
a private cause of action, intended to further that same purpose. 133 Thus, the
126. There is nothing in § 13-408 to indicate that the private cause of action was
intended to provide for anything other than an individual's action for his own
damages. The language of the section states, "any person may bring an action to
recover for injury or loss sustained by him." MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 13-408
(1975) (emphasis added). No specific provision is made for class actions. Although
they would presumably not be precluded if otherwise available, the amalgamation of
a group of small individual claims may not present an appropriate case for a class
action. See MD. R. PRoc. 209(a) ("claims of putative class members must present
common question of law or fact").
127. Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 877 (2d Cir. 1961) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting); Moretrench Corp. v. FrC, 127 F.2d 792, 795 (2d Cir. 1942).
128. In fact, imposing such a restriction might put further strain on the Division of
Consumer Protection to proceed against practices that might otherwise be handled
through private action.
129. 86 Wash. 2d 331, 544 P.2d 88 (1976).
130. Id. at 335, 544 P.2d at 91.
131. Id. at 338, 544 P.2d at 92-93. Under the Maryland Act, attorneys are exempt
from liability. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 13-104(1)(1975).
132. 86 Wash. 2d at 334, 544 P.2d at 90.
133. Id. The Lightfoot court stated:
[a]n act or practice of which a private individual may complain must be one
which also would be vulnerable to a complaint by the Attorney General under
the act. A breach of a private contract affecting no one but the parties to the
contract . . . is not an act or practice affecting the public interest.
Id. at 334, 544 P.2d at 90. In Fisher v. World-Wide Trophy Outfitters, Ltd., 15 Wash.
App. 742, 551 P.2d 1398 (1976), the Court of Appeals of Washington, construing the
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Lightfoot court implicitly agreed with the Klesner court that the mere fact
that private rights should be respected is insufficient to support a finding of
public interest.'34 This construction of the Washington Act also found
support in a provision, not found in the Maryland Act, which provides that
it "shall not be construed to prohibit acts or practices which . . . are not
injurious to the public interest .... 1,,35
A proper construction of the term "unfair or deceptive trade practices"
in Maryland's Act should give "due consideration and weight" to
interpretations of the FTC Act. 136 However, to the extent that such
interpretations would be inapplicable to the Maryland Act by virtue of the
basic differences between legislation providing only public enforcement
measures as opposed to both public and private remedies, 137 as well as
elements of a deceptive practice, appeared to interpret ambiguously the Lightfoot
public interest requirement by stating, "[tlo constitute a deceptive practice, the
advertisement need only have a tendency or capacity to deceive a substantial portion
of the purchasing public." Id. at 748, 551 P.2d at 1403. See Dempsey v. Joe Pignataro
Chevrolet, 22 Wash. App. 384, 589 P.2d 1265, 1270 (1979), for a similar formulation.
The Lightfoot requirement of a public interest precondition to a private cause
of action was apparently ignored in Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash.
App. 39, 554 P.2d 349 (1976), a case in which the court of appeals gave relief to a buyer
of a used car. The court sidestepped the issue by stating that the Lightfoot court "did
not intend to limit private consumer protection actions to only those situations where
defendant's actions cause actual injury to numerous consumers." Id. at 52, 554 P.2d at
358. However, the court held consistently with Lightfoot that an isolated sale of a four
unit apartment building was not within the ambit of the act. Allen v. Anderson, 16
Wash. App. 446, 557 P.2d 24 (1976). See also Lookebill v. Mom's Mobile Homes, Inc.,
16 Wash. App. 817, 559 P.2d 600, 604-05 (1977) (defendant seller failed to properly
complete a conditional sales security agreement; such failure was peculiar to the
plaintiffs and therefore no basis for private cause of action). In Salois v. Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978), the Supreme Court of
Washington clarified and partially modified its interpretation of the public interest
prerequisite to a private cause of action by stating that a private remedy is available
if private contracts affect the public interest, and the business of insurance affects the
public interest. 581 P.2d at 1352. Thus, plaintiffs' insureds were permitted to recover
under the act upon establishing insurer's breach of duty of good faith and fair
dealing.
134. 86 Wash. 2d at 334-35, 544 P.2d at 91.
135. Id. at 333, 544 P.2d at 90 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (1978)). This
provision may well have proved determinative, although the Washington courts may
have found a way of affording a private remedy in some cases, see Salois v. Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wash. 2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978). For examples of
interpretations of the private cause of action in state deceptive trade practice statutes
without such a restriction, see Bartner v. Cartel, 405 A.2d 194, 199-201 (Me. 1979)
(denying recovery because statute provides only for "restitution," not damages);
Baldassari v. Public Fin. Trust, 369 Mass. 33, 337 N.E.2d 701 (1975) (no "loss of money
or property" alleged).
136. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-105 (1975).
137. Other courts have noted that state statutory provisions for a private cause of
action cannot be construed in the same manner as the FTC Act. E.g., Bartner v.
Carter, 405 A.2d 194, 200-01 (Me. 1979). The Maine statute construed in Bartner,
modeled on the FTC Act, proscribed "unfair methods of competition and unfair or
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inconsistent with the stated purposes of the Maryland Act, specific
Maryland statutory purposes should control. The Consumer Protection Act
has three major purposes: to set certain minimum statewide standards for
the protection of consumers, to bolster the public's undermined confidence in
merchants, and to assist the public in obtaining relief from unlawful
practices. 138 Reading a "public interest" requirement into the Act would
frustrate these purposes, if individual injured consumers were required to
show potential or actual injury to a substantial number of other consumers.
Ingrafting a public interest requirement onto a consumer right ignores the
fact that individuals are parts of the "public"; to the extent injured
consumers are not permitted to obtain relief, public confidence in merchants
will continue to be eroded and the enforcement of minimum standards of
protection for consumers will be frustrated. Because a public interest
requirement is inapplicable to private causes of action and would hamper
the statutory purposes, and because there is no language conditioning
recovery on proof of this element, such a requirement should not be read into
the Act. 3 9
EFFECT ON REAL PROPERTY LAW
The Maryland Consumer Protection Act was amended in 1976 to cover
consumer real estate transactions. 140 Real estate brokers and salesmen are
exempt from its provisions,'4' but it likely applies at least to direct sales of
consumer homes by developers.142 Although the effect of the Act's provisions
remains to be seen, the Act has the potential of effecting changes in several
deceptive acts or practices," ME. REV. STAT. § 5-207 (1979), and stipulated that state
courts were to be guided by interpretations of the similar provision of the FTC Act by
the FTC and federal courts, id. The Maine court noted that although state courts were
to be guided by federal interpretations of the FTC Act, the provision of a private cause
of action was an "important difference" that precluded resort to federal interpreta-
tions in determining the meaning of the substantive provisions in the context of a
private suit. 405 A.2d at 200.
138. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-102(b) (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
139. The reasoning of the Lightfoot court was rejected as untenable in Singleton v.
Pennington, 568 S.W.2d 369, 371-72 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (the Lightfoot holding
"would be an unwarranted judicial invasion of legislature's primary responsibility to
determine the public interest and prescribe remedies for wrongs, both public and
private.") (dictum) (on rehearing judgment reversed on other grounds). See Slaney v.
Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 322 N.E.2d 768 (1975) (aggrieved individual to a
private contract may recover under the Consumer Protection Act).
140. Ch. 907, 1976 Md. Laws 2487.
141. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-104(1) (1975).
142. Brokers' principals, even individual sellers, are not excluded by the terms of
the Act. A "merchant" includes "a person who directly or indirectly either offers or
makes available to consumers any. . . consumer realty," id. § 13-101(g) (Cum. Supp.
1979), a definition that seems to include all sellers. It seems unlikely, however, that an
individual offering his home for sale would be within the purview of the Act. The word
"merchant" connotes someone in the business of selling, a connotation likely
contemplated by the General Assembly. The statutory provision that refers to erosion
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established common law doctrines and statutory provisions relating to real
property. Since transactions involving real property are likely to involve
substantially greater sums of money than most consumer transactions,
private suits may be likely in this area.
Merger Into the Deed
One of the most firmly established common law doctrines involving real
property is the merger of contract rights into the deed. This doctrine, which
accords finality to real estate transactions, excludes parol evidence for the
purpose of "contradicting, adding to, subtracting from, or varying the terms
of a deed."' 4 3 Application of the doctrine raises a prima facie presumption,
upon acceptance of the deed, that the deed is a final execution of the whole
contract. The deed supercedes any original agreement, and all rights and
remedies of the parties in relation to the contract must be determined by the
deed; 14 all prior negotiations and agreements are excluded from considera-
tion once the deed is signed.1 5 The only exceptions to this principle of law
arise when the deed is only a partial execution of the contract, 146 or where
there is fraud147 or mistake4 8 in the terms and execution of the deed. Due to
the limited number of exceptions available under this doctrine, the grantor
is generally insulated from liability once the deed is accepted. The Consumer
Protection Act, however, appears to have carved out another exception to the
traditional rule. The language of the Act provides that a grantor may later
be challenged upon the representations (or lack of them) that produced the
transaction. 49 As a result, sellers of realty must more carefully consider the
legal implications of their conduct, and may no longer find sanctuary in the
delivery of the deed.
Perhaps because the doctrine of merger may lead to harsh results, courts
have readily found a prior or contemporaneous oral or written agreement to
be collateral to and consistent with the deed, and therefore admissible.5"
Examples include provisions for specific improvements15 1 or the construc-
of public confidence in merchants, id. § 13-102(2), also notes that it is likely that most
business people are honest, id. (emphasis added).
It should also be noted that transactions involving the sale of farm land
would be included. Consumer realty refers to realty "primarily for personal,
household, family, or agricultural purposes." Id. § 13- 101(d).
143. Bladen v. Wells, 30 Md. 577, 581 (1869).
144. Stevens v. Milestone, 190 Md. 61, 65, 57 A.2d 292, 293 (1948); Levin v. Cook,
186 Md. 535, 539, 47 A.2d 505, 507 (1946); Buckner v. Hesson, 159 Md. 461, 464, 150 A.
852, 853 (1930).
145. Millison v. Fruchtman, 214 Md. 515, 518, 136 A.2d 240, 242 (1957).
146. Laurel Realty Co. v. Himelfarb, 194 Md. 672, 677, 72 A.2d 23, 24 (1950).
147. Bladen v. Wells, 30 Md. 577, 581 (1869).
148. Buckner v. Hesson, 159 Md. 461, 150 A. 852 (1930).
149. See MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-301 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
150. See, e.g., Levin v. Cook, 186 Md. 535, 47 A.2d 505 (1946); Rosenthal v. Heft, 155
Md. 410, 418, 142 A. 598, 602 (1928); Bryant v. Wilson, 71 Md. 440, 443, 18 A. 916, 919
(1889).
151. Stevens v. Milestone, 190 Md. 61, 57 A.2d 292 (1948).
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tion of a house.'52 This judicial mitigation of the rule, however, does not
extend as far as the Consumer Protection Act; the common law exception
facilitates relief only in cases in which there was an actual agreement.
An examination of the Court of Appeals' decision in Heckrotte v.
Riddle,153 will illustrate the Act's possible amelioration of established
precedents. The plaintiffs in Heckrotte had purchased a house that -
unknown to them - violated the county zoning regulations. In affirming the
dismissal of their subsequent complaint, the court held that the purchasers
must exercise reasonable diligence to ascertain compliance with the zoning
regulations, and that their acceptance of the deed created a prima facie
presumption that it was in final execution of the contract of sale, thus
determining the rights of the parties. 5 4 The seller in Heckrotte made no
statement as to the building's location or compliance with zoning
regulations. Under section 13-301(3) of the Consumer Protection Act, failure
to state a material fact that "deceives or tends to deceive" may constitute a
deceptive practice. 5 5 Application of this provision to the facts in Heckrotte
may lead to the conclusions that the seller's silence with respect to zoning
regulations constituted a deceptive practice, and that section 13-301 of the
Act was intended to displace any common law doctrines that might operate
to deny consumers relief with respect to such realty transactions. This
conclusion is supported by the language and purpose of the Act and by
analogy to the established fraud exception to the operation of the doctrine of
merger.
Parol Evidence Rule
The parol evidence rule, a corollary to the merger doctrine, excludes
from evidence antecedent agreements introduced for the purpose of varying
or contradicting a written agreement. 15 6 The issue arises as to how a
plaintiff may establish his case under section 13-301 if he is a party to a
written contract. 15 7 If the rule is found applicable, a severe restriction will be
152. Kandalis v. Paul Pet Constr. Co., 210 Md. 319, 123 A.2d 345 (1956).
153. 224 Md. 591, 168 A.2d 879 (1961).
154. Id. at 595, 168 A.2d at 881.
155. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 13-301(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
156. The parol evidence rule provides that:
Where two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a writing to
which they have both assented as the complete and accurate integration of
that contract, evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent understand-
ings and negotiations will not be admitted for the purpose of varying or
contradicting the writing.
3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 573 (1960). For examples of the rule's application in
Maryland, see England v. Universal Fin. Co., 186 Md. 432, 47 A.2d 389 (1946); Markoff
v. Kreiner, 180 Md. 150, 154-55, 23 A.2d 19, 23 (1941).
157. Cases of fraud are excepted from the operation of the parol evidence rule.
Rinaudo v. Bloom, 209 Md. 1, 9, 120 A.2d 184, 189 (1956). Thus, the question again
arises whether the deceptive practices characterized by the Act can be treated
similarly to the fraud exception for the purpose of escape from the rule.
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ingrafted on the language of section 13-301. As in the case of the merger
doctrine, the language and broad remedial purposes of the Act suggest that
this common law rule should be inapplicable to actions brought pursuant to
the Act. One commentator has considered the problem of construction in the
following manner:
The basic difference between this and other areas of law is that the
law of unfair and deceptive practices is result oriented. The emphasis is
on the relationships between the parties throughout the transaction,
including the inducements to enter into an agreement as well as conduct
subsequent to the consummation of that agreement. The totality of the
relationship between the parties is relevant. The written document
purporting to be a contract is no longer of primary importance.'5 s
Under this reasoning, if -the remedial purposes of the Act are to be fulfilled,
an action brought under the Consumer Protection Act should be exempt
from the parol evidence rule.159
Statutory Provisions
One area of potential conflict of the Consumer Protection Act with the
provisions of the Real Property Article is in the latter's warranty
provisions. 16 The most obvious example is the "special warranty," generally
provided in the standard form deed. A special warranty is a covenant by the
grantor that he will "warrant forever and defend the property to the grantee
against any lawful claim and demand of the grantor and every person
claiming or to claim by, through, or under him."1 6 In some deeds, a grantor
also provides a general warranty, which "has the same effect as if the
grantor had covenanted that he will warrant forever the property to the
grantee against every lawful claim and demand of any person."' 62 These
express warranties, in conjunction with section 2-115 of the Real Property
Article, which negates any implied warranties, 63 provide the basis for all
buyer and seller rights and obligations with respect to title.
158. 2 CONSUMER LAw HANDBOOK 115 (1976).
159. A case that could be decided differently if brought pursuant to the Consumer
Protection Act is Delmarva Drill Co., Inc. v. Tuckahoe Shopping Center Inc., 268 Md.
417, 302 A.2d 37 (1973), in which the court stated:
Here, the contract was clear and unambiguous on its face and hence, as a
matter of substantive law, parol evidence of a prior or contemporaneous
promise to supply "usable water" could not be admitted to contradict a written
contract providing that "[no specific guarantee is given concerning quality of
water."
Id. at 426, 302 A.2d at 41. Assurances by the defendants that they would produce
usable water could be construed as a false representation of a service under
§ 13-301(2). MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-301(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
160. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 2-105, -106 (1974).
161. Id. § 2-106.
162. Id. § 2-105.
163. "There is no implied covenant or warranty by the grantor as to title or
possession in any grant of land or of any interest or estate in land. However, in a
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Regardless of any contractual agreement under the above provisions as
to general or special warranties, the Consumer Protection Act could extend
an implied warranty of title to real estate transactions. Section 13-301(2)
provides that it is an unfair or deceptive trade practice to make a repre-
sentation that consumer realty has a characteristic that it does not have. 64
Alternatively, section 13-301(3) defines a prohibited practice in terms of
"[flailure to state a material fact if the failure deceives or tends to
deceive."' 16 Application of section 13-301 of the Consumer Protection Act
might provide consumers with greater protection than appears to exist
under the Real Property Article.
Another potential conflict arises with regard to the Statute of Frauds,166
which requires all contracts with respect to real property to be in writing. 6 7
Real property contracts are not enforceable unless a writing is produced.
Under subsections 13-301(1) and (2) of the Consumer Protection Act,
however, a consumer may sue for a false representation concerning
consumer realty regardless of whether a writing exists. 68 Alternatively, a
consumer could recover for damage sustained as a result of nonacquisition
of property offered or advertised, even in the absence of a writing, under
subsection 13-301(5), which prohibits advertisement or offer of consumer
realty "[w]ithout intent to sell, lease, or rent them as advertised or
offered."' 69 It remains to be seen, however, whether in light of the language
and purpose of section 13-301, the Statute of Frauds will be held
inapplicable to suits under the Act.
In addition to the general warranty provisions, the Real Property Article
provides for express and implied warranties in connection with the sale of
new housing.7 0 These warranties, patterned after the Uniform Commercial
Code's express and implied warranties,' 7' protect the purchaser of a home
lease, unless the lease provides otherwise, there is an implied covenant by the lessor
that the lessee shall quietly enjoy the land." Id. §2-115.
164. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-301(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
165. Id. § 13-301(3).
166. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 5-101 to -108 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1979). See
generally Cambridge, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 471 F. Supp. 1309, 1313 (D.
Md. 1979).
167. An exception to this writing requirement is leasehold estates for less than one
year. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 5-102 (1974).
168. The Act has no explicit requirement that a writing must exist in order to bring
an action. Nor does it make sense to imply a writing requirement, since the bulk of
real estate transactions would then be unprotected under the Act.
169. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 13-301(5) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
170. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 10-201 to -203 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
171. See MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. §§ 2-313 to § 315 (1975 & .Cum. Supp. 1979). The
potential inconsistencies which exist with respect to the Real Property Article implied
warranty provisions also exist with these analogous Uniform Commercial Code
provisions. It should be noted however, that the Maryland version of the Uniform
Commercial Code expressly excludes consumer goods from the provision for exclusion
of warranties. Id. § 316.1 (1975).
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from a defect that either was the "basis of the bargain"'172 or caused the
house to be unfit for habitation' 73 or for a particular purpose intended by the
purchaser. 174 In Krol v. York Terrace Building, Inc.,175 for example, the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that the failure of a water well was
sufficiently serious to demonstrate a breach of these statutory warranties.176
In contrast, an element of materiality is omitted from six of the nine unfair
or deceptive trade practice definitions based on representations or state-
ments. 77 Even if a materiality requirement is read into section 13-301, it
nevertheless is a less stringent standard than that of common law
materiality. 7 8 The Consumer Protection Act could therefore reasonably be
read to expand the scope of these warranties, and a seller's liability may be
extended to include defects that do not render the home uninhabitable.' 79
The Real Property Article provides self-contained packages of rights and
remedies with respect to protection of security deposits'80 and mandatory
disclosure requirements in connection with the initial sale of condominium
units,' 8 ' including specific remedies for false statements and omissions of
material facts. 18 2 These provisions were enacted to cover their respective
areas fully. If the Act is applicable, however, other instances of incomplete
disclosure or other types of misrepresentations may be the subject of
liability.
In each of the preceding illustrations of the potential ramifications of
the Consumer Protection Act, certain limiting provisions of the Real
Property Article may be rendered inapplicable in the area of consumer
transactions. 8 3 While the Act is not always inconsistent with the Real
172. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-202 (1974) (express warranties).
173. Id. § 10-203(a) (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1979) (implied warranty).
174. Id. § 10-203(c) (1974). The particular purpose must have been made known to
the seller, and the purchaser must have been relying on the seller's skill. Id.
175. 35 Md. App. 321, 370 A.2d 589 (1977).
176. Id. at 332, 370 A.2d at 596.
177. See MD. CoM. LAw CODE ANN. § 13-301 (Cum. Supp. 1979). For a discussion of
the meaning of materiality except with respect to omissions, see text accompanying
notes 101 to 107 supra.
178. See text accompanying notes 101 to 107 supra.
179. The Act is limited to homes which are primarily for personal, household.
family, or agricultural purposes, MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-01(d) (CuM. Supp.
1979); the Real Property Article warranties apply to all new private dwelling units,
MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 10- 201 (1974).
180. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-203 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
181. Id. § 11-124 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
182. Id. § 11-124(e). This section provides that a seller who makes untrue
statements of material facts or who omits material facts in the required disclosure is
liable to the buyer.
Section 11-119 gives a unit owner or the council of unit owners a cause of
action against an owner who fails to comply with the statute or with the required
condominium declaration or bylaws. Id. § 11-119(a). Damages or injunctive relief may
be sought, and the prevailing party is entitled to attorneys' fees. Id.
183. It is, of course, quite possible that conflicts between the Act and real property
law will be resolved in favor of the latter. A court might find that the General
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Property Article, applying it in this area may disrupt the existing nature of
business relationships by upsetting the expectations of individuals relying
on the limited remedies provided by the Real Property Article. Whether an
aggrieved consumer will be permitted to invoke the Consumer Protection
Act's remedies in lieu of or in addition to remedies provided by the Real
Property Article will ultimately depend on a careful construction and
application of the relevant provisions to a concrete factual situation.
CONCLUSION
Despite the absence of appellate decisions construing the Maryland
Consumer Protection Act, an analysis of the purpose and language of the
statute, in conjunction with interpretations of the FTC Act, provides a
framework for, and some insight into, the probable application of the Act
and the difficulties which may accompany its application. The enactment of
the Consumer Protection Act was a legislative response to the impotence of
the consumer to protect himself from many kinds of deceptive practices. In
addition to public enforcement provisions, the Act created new substantive
rights, and extended old ones, for the consumer by providing a private
action for damages. Although the Act has broadened the scope of liability
for misrepresentations and has eliminated in most instances the need to
establish scienter, obstacles to the achievement of its broad remedial
purposes remain. The relatively small amount of damages ordinarily
suffered in consumer transactions continue to render a cause of action under
the Act uneconomic.18 4 Although creation of a private cause of action may
Assembly did not intend to disturb long-settled principles such as warranty of title,
but only to prevent sharp practices in unconsummated consumer real estate sales.
184. See Eovaldi & Gestrin, supra note 19. This deficiency could be corrected by
amending the Act to allow awards of reasonable attorneys' fees, as do fortyjurisdictions. See ALAsKA STAT. § 45.50.531(d) (Supp. 1979); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 70-927(b) (Supp. 1977); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17082 (West 1964); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 6-1-113 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110(g) (West Cum. Supp. 1979);
D.C. CODE ANN. tit. 28, App. § 6(k) (Supp. V 1978); DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 2501 (1975); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 501-210 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 106-703(b) (1968);
HAwAn REV. STAT. § 481 A-4 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 48-608(3) (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 1211/2 § 313 (Smith Hurd Cum. Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.54(a) (Burns
Cum. Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. §50-634(e) (Cum. Supp. 1978); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 367.220(3) (Cum. Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409(A) (West Cum. Supp.
1979); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 10, § 1213 (Cum. Supp. 1978) MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 93A, § 9
(1972); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 445.911 (Cum. Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 325.773(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15(2) (Cum. Supp.
1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.025(1) (1979); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 85-408(3) (Cum.
Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. §87-303 (1976); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §358-A:10(I)
(Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §56:8-19 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§57-12-10(c) (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. §75-16.1 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1345.09(F) (Page Supp. 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 78, § 54(b) (1976); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 646.638(3) (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-9.2 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 6-13.1-5.2(d) (Cum. Supp. 1978); S.C. CODE § 39-5-140(a) (1976); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 47-18-109(e) (1979); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. tit. 2 § 17.50(c)
(Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19(5) (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT.
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make it more attractive for consumers to protect themselves against unfair
or deceptive practices, uncertainty as to its application has in the past
slowed its effectiveness as a viable consumer remedy. Although this
Comment has attempted to provide a framework for a proper interpretation
of the Act, the precise scope of the legislation remains unclear.
ANN. tit. 9, § 2461(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979); VA. CODE § 59.1-204(B) (Cum. Supp. 1979);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.090 (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. §425.308 (1974); Wyo.
STAT. § 40-109 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
To meet the criticism that allowance of attorney fees would encourage many
groundless suits, a provision could be drafted that would allow attorneys fees to
prevailing defendants when the action brought by the plaintiff was "spurious or
brought for harassment purposes only." See IDAHO CODE § 48-608(3) (1977). Among
the various state consumer protection acts that allow private remedies, 17 states
permit multiple damages, 11 permit punitive damages, and 14 states allow minimum
statutory damages. See SHELDON & ZWEIBEL, State UDAP Statute Characteristics
Chart in DEPT. OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIM. JUSTICE, SURVEY OF CONSUMER FRAUD
LAW 122 (June 1978).

